The Austrian School seems to remain outside the debate on the realism of economic models. In principle, given the association of the term “model” with the Chicago School, and also for understanding that Hayek had critized the model of perfect competition as unrealistic. Even though in previous opportunities we showed how the theory of market as a process could be understood as the model of the Austrian School, and that Hayek’s criticism to the model of perfect competition was not so (...) much of unrealistic, but that it was wrongly stated (Zanotti & Borella, 2015), and we developed the ontological foundation of the model in Hayek’s thought (Borella, 2019), in this paper we will show how it is posible to compare pattern predictions with models, and how in this sense, the Austrian School, also seems to get near, even without sufficiently noticing it, to the discussion on models in economics and their realism. Keywords: Realism of models- Hayek- pattern predictions-models . (shrink)

In the debate on realism of models in economics, the Austrian School and Hayekin particular, seem to have, in a certain way, remained outside. Assuming neoclassical models asunrealistic, the theory of the market as a process looks like a more realistic proposal. However, oneof the fundamental issue s in Hayek’s dissent is not so much the unrealism of the assumptions, but that the market equilibrium theory was not correctly raised, especially with regards to the perfectknowledge assumption. Despite this, in this (...) setting and in line with a previous paper (Zanotti & Borella, 2015), we will argue that Hayek’s spontaneous order may be understood as the Austrian School’s “model”, assuming Mäki’s MISS version of models (Models as Isolations and Surrogate Systems) and emphasizing the place of the ontological foundation of Hayek’s proposal when assessing his model. (shrink)

El propósito de este trabajo consiste en penetrar el misterio por el cual Dios, máximamente Bueno y Sabio permite el mal en el mundo. A fin de poder alcanzar este objetivo se intentará profundizar las nociones de misterio, mal y Providencia. Se considerará la ubicación del tema dentro del campo de la metafísica teniendo en cuenta que se trata de un tema límite dentro de la filosofía. Asimismo se mostrarán aquellas premisas, que supone la cuestión aquí analizada, que son: el (...) mal en el mundo y Dios. Al avanzar en el tratamiento de este misterio se tendrán especialmente presentes las dificultades gnoseológicas que surgen de considerar el objeto de estudio de la filosofía primera. Este misterio se profundizará tomando especialmente el análisis que de él realizan Santo Tomás de Aquino y Wilhelm Leibnitz. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo consiste en penetrar en la condición vulnerable del hombre. Para ello analizaré cuidadosamente el significado de este término teniendo en cuenta que esta “característica” de la persona se hace manifiesta cuando entra en relación con el Otro. Es a partir de este encuentro con el Otro que se hace patente la vulnerabilidad, profundidad y riqueza de cada uno.

La propuesta de Steve Fuller sobre el re-encantamiento de la ciencia, que presenta en su libro “Philosophy of Science and Technology Studies” se encuadra en su epistemología social. Los estudios de la ciencia y la tecnología (ECT) invitan a revisar la filosofía de la ciencia tradicional y a volver la mirada sobre la sociología de la ciencia. Plantean una noción de ciencia distinta y una relación nueva entre racionalidad y conocimiento científico. Presentan a la ciencia orientada a la transformación social, (...) y conforme a esto proponen los investigadores ECT re-encantar la ciencia, de forma tal que se pueda restablecer la relación entre ésta y la “gente común”. Este re-encantamiento supone como condición la secularización de la ciencia. En torno a esta propuesta introduce categorías nuevas: entendimiento público, popularización y “esoterización”, puritanismo y gnosticismo científico, iglesia ECT, ciencia del ciudadano, conocimiento indígena y conferencias del consenso. A través de estos conceptos intentaremos aproximarnos a una noción de re-encantamiento de la ciencia y su proyecto de una transformación social. (shrink)

En este capítulo ofrecemos una introducción sistemática e histórica a la lógica, disciplina que contribuyó en gran medida a la producción del conocimiento en general y a la formación del pensamiento científico en particular. La primera sección contiene la introducción sistemática: primero, presentamos las distintas disciplinas que forman parte de la lógica en el sentido amplio del término; luego, identificamos a la lógica en sentido canónico o estricto como el estudio la validez; por último, explicamos en qué sentido la validez (...) es una propiedad formal. La segunda sección contiene la introducción histórica; nos detenemos, en particular, a estudiar dos hitos: el nacimiento de la lógica como disciplina con Aristóteles, y la intervención de Gottlob Frege, a quien se debe, en gran parte, el surgimiento de la lógica tal como la conocemos. Finalmente, damos un breve comentario del estado actual de la disciplina. (shrink)

In classroom sessions, various student-centered learning approaches, such as collaborative and problem-based learning, are used. Today, incorporating Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) into nursing education promotes self-directed and personalized learning among students.

Si bien no es habitual pensar a Hayek en términos de realismo, sino comprenderlo como neokantiano, presentaremos la interpretación realista fenomenológica de Hayek que ofrece Zanotti a lo largo de su obra. Señalaremos los aspectos centrales de la epistemología de Hayek y la lectura realista fenomenológica como una posición superadora tanto del positivismo como de una hermenéutica relativista.

Tony Lawson, founder of The Social Ontology Group and The Realist Workshop of Cambridge, has proposed critical realism to reorient economics. The transformation of the social world that Lawson tries, emerges from the adherence to critical realism, this is, from taking the transcendental realism of Roy Bhaskar to the social realm. With the purpose of deepening the criticisms to this movement, we will specify what is critical realism, and which are the philosophical assumptions of the mainstream according to this author. (...) We will set out the criticisms on: a) the notion of mainstream economics, b) the possibilities of economics based on social ontology, c) the realism of economic models, and d) the notions of isolation and abstraction. (shrink)

In this paper we will analyze Lawson’s criticism of Hayek for not having transcended positivism. We will distinguish two levels in the criticism: methodological and ontological. So far as methodological criticism is concerned, we consider that Lawson’s positivist interpretation of Hayek regarding the method in economics is not the only possible, and we will try to develop another one. With respect to ontological criticism, we will state that though it is possible to understand Hayek as an ontological positivist, since he (...) assumes an ontological individualism, this fact would not necessarily lead to positivism -question to which Lawson seems to bring Hayek closer after 1955- but a moderate ontological individualism could be assigned to Hayek founded on a realistic interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology. (shrink)

Conocer los mecanismos que operan en el mundo social es tarea fundamental de la economía como ciencia. La transformación del mundo social está vinculada a la reorientación de esta disciplina. Tal es la propuesta de Tony Lawson y la Escuela de Cambridge. Para que la economía sea reorientada ha de ajustarse a los presupuestos ontológicos del Realismo Crítico. En este trabajo se intentará profundizar en la naturaleza de los mecanismos y su relación con la economía como ciencia, y se presentarán (...) dos dificultades en torno a esta noción: a) la posibilidad de una teoría económica de sistemas abiertos, y b) el conocimiento de los mecanismos. (shrink)

This paper tries to penetrate Jon Elster’s contribution to ratioanlity in the frame of the problem ofmeans and ends rationality. To treat rationality in Elster, we will study the imperfect rationality and its relation to weakness of will,and the development of precommitment strategies. We will also point out the role of Emotions, false beliefs and cognitive fallacies in the consideration of rationality. We Will show the difference that the author makes between the thin theory and the broad theory of rationality. (...) Taking into account Hamlin’s distinction between means, beliefs, ends and extended rationality, we will explain the relation between his belief rationality and Elster’s broad theory. (shrink)

Tony Lawson, fundador del Grupo de Ontología Social y del Taller Realista de Cambridge, ha propuesto el realismo crítico para reorientar la economía. La transformación del mundo social, que intenta Lawson, surge de la adhesión al realismo crítico, esto es, de trasladar el realismo trascendental de Roy Bhaskar al reino social. Con el propósito de profundizar en las críticas a este movimiento, explicitaremos en qué consiste el realismo crítico, y cuáles son los presupuestos filosóficos de la mainstream según este autor. (...) Plantearemos las críticas en torno a: a) la noción de economía mainstream, b) las posibilidades de una economía fundada en la ontología social, c) el realismo de los modelos económicos y d) las nociones de aislamiento y abstracción. (shrink)

Cuestiones vinculadas a la responsabilidad social empresaria y la presencia de valores éticos en las empresas han cobrado especial importancia. Si bien no siempre se manifiestan concretamente, al menos se han hecho presentes en los aspectos a considerar en las organizaciones sociales. Pero los mayores inconvenientes al tratar el tema de la ética en la empresa, no residen en señalar si hay o no valores que rigen la práctica de las organizaciones sociales, porque en sentido amplio todos estaríamos de acuerdo (...) en que los hay, sino en determinar cuál es el contenido de la ética a la que se hace referencia cuando se habla de ética de la empresa; donde el concepto " valor " , ya no es entendido en sentido amplio, y " se convierte " en " determinados valores éticos " que ordenan o " debieran ordenar " el quehacer de las organizaciones sociales. Con el fin de señalar el contenido propio de esta ética, y siguiendo la propuesta de Adela Cortina, intentaremos penetrar en esto que la autora ha llamado ética de mínimos, sobre la que se apoya la ética de máximos que permite a las personas alcanzar la felicidad. (shrink)

El objetivo del presente trabajo es señalar algunas primeras aproximaciones a la cuestión del principio de racionalidad en el pensamiento de Karl Popper. Si bien este tema específicamente pareciera no mostrarse con precisión, (cuestión marcada por diversos autores), al menos no como lo es su propuesta falsacionista, se intentará retomar las principales notas sobre el principio de racionalidad e indicar algunas aproximaciones al debate epistemológico que surge en torno a este principio.

El presente trabajo intenta profundizar en la noción de mecanismo en el Realismo Crítico de Tony Lawson. Penetraremos en la naturaleza de los mecanismos en este autor. Señalaremos su importancia para conocer el reino social, transformarlo y reorientar la economía. Mostraremos algunas dificultades presentes en la propuesta de Lawson en torno a esta noción: acerca de la viabilidad de una teoría económica para los sistemas abiertos; sobre el valor explicativo de los transfácticos y las posibilidades de conocer los mecanismos.

The form of an action has a strong influence on the interaction between humans. According to their mood, people may perform the same gesture in different ways, such as gently or rudely. These aspects of social communication are named vitality forms by Daniel Stern, represent a mean to establish a direct and immediate connection with others. Indeed, the expression of different vitality forms enables us to communicate our affective states and at the same time the perception of these vitality forms (...) enables people around us to understand how we feel in that moment. In the last years of research, different fMRI studies have been carried out to investigate the neural correlates of vitality forms recognition and execution. Moreover, recent psychophysics studies conducted from our research group have demonstrated the presence of an affective contagion effect, during which vitality forms expressed by an agent affect the action perception and the motor response of the receiver. This means that vitality forms expressed by others can influence our mood positively or negatively, modulating as consequence our behavior. Note that vitality forms pervade our lives in a continuous manner and thus they are not expressed and perceived only during social interactions. For example, when we observe an artistic representation at the theatre, the dynamic postures of dancers, together with an alternation of acceleration and deceleration in their movements, communicate to us different affective states. Also when we are in a museum in front of a painting, lines, colors and shapes used by the artist can elicit in us different sensations and modify our attitude. In this view, with the aim to extend the concept of vitality forms from neuroscience and psychology to other disciplines of study, we dedicate part of this review to discuss how art, in all its forms, can be considered a pure expression of vitality forms. (shrink)

El presente trabajo intenta profundizar en la noción de racionalidad y la lógica de la situación de Karl Popper en el marco del debate entre “economía sustantiva” y “economía formal o instrumental”. Con tal propósito realizaremos una breve aproximación histórica al concepto de racionalidad económica señalando los distintos aportes de diversos autores a la cuestión. Este marco histórico permitirá encuadrar el planteo que Karl R. Popper hace de la lógica de la situación como metodología de las ciencias sociales tomada de (...) la teoría económica. En cuanto a la racionalidad y la lógica de la situación en Popper distinguiremos algunas notas acerca del análisis situacional y de la noción de racionalidad que subyace al mismo. Analizaremos el principio de racionalidad y el debate en torno al status epistemológico de tal principio. (shrink)

Karl Popper presenta al realismo como su posición acerca del conocimiento, distinguiéndola del instrumentalismo y del esencialismo. Ataca del primero la consideración meramente instrumental de las teorías científicas. Del segundo, critica que sostenga la posibilidad de establecer la verdad definitiva de las teorías, y que éstas describen esencias. El instrumentalismo coincide con Popper en que no hay conocimiento de esencias a través de las teorías científicas, pero de ello infiere que las teorías son meros instrumentos. Popper señala que el carácter (...) meramente instrumental de las teorías las vuelve irrefutables. Porque un instrumento de predicción no puede ser refutado (cf. Popper (1972a, p. 149)). Además, el instrumentalismo no puede explicar el interés del científico por la verdad. Su esencialismo modificado, toma del esencialismo que “el científico aspira a una verdadera descripción del mundo o de algunos de sus aspectos, y a una explicación verdadera de los hechos observables” (Popper, 1972a, p. 150). Pero agrega que no es posible saber con certeza si sus hallazgos son verdaderos. Resaltar el carácter conjetural de las teorías científicas no implica disminuir la aspiración del científico a describir algo real. (shrink)

Even though Popper, Lawson and Mäki are realists, the three of them understand by realism something different and support different positions on the use of models in economics. In this article we will compare the three proposals on their conceptions of reality, the function and the nature of economic models and their use to study the social world.

Se analizará en este texto la noción de aislamiento en el Realismo Crítico de Tony Lawson y su relación con su posición frente al uso de los modelos económicos mainstream para acceder al mundo social. Distinguiremos las nociones de abstracción y aislamiento en este autor. Mostraremos la irreductibilidad de las mismas y que la consideración de la complejidad de la realidad social se relaciona con su posición sobre el rol del aislamiento para llegar a ella.

This paper tries to deepen the notion of isolation in Tony Lawson´s Critical Realism and its relation with his position on the use of mainstream economic models to access the social world. I distinguish the notion of isolation and abstraction in this author. I show that the consideration of the complexity of social reality is related to his position on the role of isolation to reach it. Lawson´s social ontology is central to establish what the role is that isolation performs (...) in the knowledge of the social realm. There is, in this author, a pre-eminence of the ontological over the theoretical. How the world is determines the methodological possibilities to know it. (shrink)

El Realismo Crítico Auténtico (RCA) sostenido por Uskali Mäki se distingue del Realismo Crítico de Lawson. En el marco del Realismo Mínimo se explicitará qué es el RCA y se presentará el Realismo Posible de los modelos económicos en su versión MISS. Se diferenciará el Realismo Mínimo del Realismo Científico Standard. Se desarrollarán las dificultades en torno al RCA.

Penetrar en la cuestión del otro es un tema clave para entender al hombre. ¿Quién es el otro? En la respuesta a esta pregunta encontramos quiénes somos nosotros mismos. Es propósito de este trabajo intentar responder a esto, y analizar aquella virtud que pone en un lugar central el problema de la alteridad, la justicia. Para esto, indicaremos la necesidad de “recordar” en el mundo contemporáneo la “existencia del otro”. Señalaremos algunas diferentes maneras de entender al otro. Mostraremos las características (...) de los pseudo-encuentros, y las implicancias de la posibilidad del encuentro. Así también, distinguiremos las dificultades que surgen en el encuentro con el otro. Consideraremos algunos tipos de justicia: del ser, del orden, y del destino ya contemplados en la obra de Guardini. Intentaremos responder a la pregunta ¿quién es mi prójimo? y explicitar su relación fundamental con la disposición a hacerse prójimo. Señalaremos también la profunda vinculación entre responsabilidad y acción. Por último, destacaremos la importancia de los sujetos particulares en el trabajo por el bien común. -/- . (shrink)

La cuestión del principio de racionalidad en el pensamiento de Karl Popper pareciera no mostrarse con precisión (observación hecha por diversos autores), al menos no como lo es su propuesta falsacionista. Pero intentaré retomar las principales notas sobre este principio e indicar algunas aproximaciones al debate epistemológico que surgen en torno a él. Popper trata de hallar un método que permita el conocimiento de las ciencias naturales y de las ciencias sociales, proponiendo un monismo metodológico. Sin embargo, al referirse a (...) las ciencias sociales, señala que éstas han de realizar explicaciones basadas en tendencias que permitan construir modelos “en términos de individuos”, llamando a esto “individualismo metodológico.” Mostrando que en las ciencias sociales intervienen proposiciones históricas singulares, se hace presente la dificultad en torno a estas ciencias; en relación a esto explica que en la mayoría de las situaciones sociales hay un elemento de racionalidad, introduciendo así el “método de construcción racional o lógica” o “método cero.”. (shrink)

Readers are awaiting a new encounter with stories united under the common title Why We Are in Need of Tales. Let me remind you that these deep philosophical books were written by Maria daVenza Tillmanns, a professional philosopher dedicated to the study of philosophizing with children, who has gained valuable experience in this field. Maria’s books are inspired by her work with her students at El Toyon Elementary School in National City (California), with whom Maria held philosophy with children classes (...) for three years before COVID-19. With parental permission, the children provided their drawings, which are used as illustrations for the books. I read Why We Are in Need of Tales, Part III with great pleasure. The focus of this book is on making decisions, sometimes very hard decisions. In Part II, the focus is on dreams — hopes and wishes we have for life. This book looks at how we may best decide how to make those hopes and wishes come true. And the answer Huk and Tuk suggest is deceptively easy: by making decisions “with your eyes wide open.” (5, p. ix). The author of this excellent book managed to describe how to make decisions with your eyes wide open through the playful dialogue between Huk and Tuk. The books are written in dialogue so the reader immediately plunges into the context of a lively conversation. Dialogue not only sharpens attention, but also invites the reader to participate in the conversation. In this way, the reader becomes a listener at the same time. (shrink)

The aim of this paper lies in characterizing the explanations and models used in the field of evolutionary developmental biology throughout its history. While manipulative experiments in controlled conditions have been useful to set the bases of the discipline and are still routinely performed, this approach supposes a tension between the reliability and the representativity of the conclusions. Given the recent changes in the understanding of evolutionary phenomena, different authors currently emphasize the need of avoiding excessive simplifications in experimental approaches, (...) incorporating the complexity of the analyzed systems as a relevant trait in the study of biological diversity. On the other hand, the fragile and contingent nature of evolutionary processes and the impossibility of intervening some of these phenomena underscore the importance of non-manipulative models that allow the elucidation of how-possibly mechanisms. We argue that a pluralism characterized by the integration of different kinds of explanations, models and metaphors used in evo-devo allows to exploit their respective advantages, favours interdisciplinarity and can contribute to form a representative description of evolutionary processes without relinquishing the local and detailed study of actual mechanisms. (shrink)

Interview with the author of "why We are in Need of Tails." Iguana Books, Toronto, Canada.

The aim of this paper is to analyze time-asymmetric quantum mechanics with respect to the problems of irreversibility and of time's arrow. We begin with arguing that both problems are conceptually different. Then, we show that, contrary to a common opinion, the theory's ability to describe irreversible quantum processes is not a consequence of the semigroup evolution laws expressing the non-time-reversal invariance of the theory. Finally, we argue that time-asymmetric quantum mechanics, either in Prigogine's version or in Bohm's version, does (...) not solve the problem of the arrow of time because it does not supply a substantial and theoretically founded criterion for distinguishing between the two directions of time. (shrink)

Human nature has always been a foundational issue for philosophy. What does it mean to have a human nature? Is the concept the relic of a bygone age? What is the use of such a concept? What are the epistemic and ontological commitments people make when they use the concept? In What’s Left of Human Nature? Maria Kronfeldner offers a philosophical account of human nature that defends the concept against contemporary criticism. In particular, she takes on challenges related to social (...) misuse of the concept that dehumanizes those regarded as lacking human nature (the dehumanization challenge); the conflict between Darwinian thinking and essentialist concepts of human nature (the Darwinian challenge); and the consensus that evolution, heredity, and ontogenetic development results from nurture and nature. After answering each of these challenges, Kronfeldner presents a revisionist account of human nature that minimizes dehumanization and does not fall back on outdated biological ideas. Her account is post-essentialist because it eliminates the concept of an essence of being human; pluralist in that it argues that there are different things in the world that correspond to three different post-essentialist concepts of human nature; and interactive because it understands nature and nurture as interacting at the developmental, epigenetic, and evolutionary levels. On the basis of this, she introduces a dialectical concept of an ever-changing and “looping” human nature. Finally, noting the essentially contested character of the concept and the ambiguity and redundancy of the terminology, she wonders if we should simply eliminate the term “human nature” altogether. (shrink)

Escribir hoy en día un libro sobre hermenéutica, que tal hermenéutica se refiera a la desarrollada por G. Gadamer en su conocido Verdad y método y que se pretenda añadir algo nuevo a lo mucho escrito sobre el tema parecería, a primera vista, empresa irrealizable. Que ambas pretensiones inspiren la sólida monografía de María G. Navarro —titulada Interpretar y argumentar— constituye empresa audaz y arriesgada, plena de coraje innovador, que provoca admiración, curiosidad e interés. Contra lo que pudiera parecer (...) a primera vista, el libro contiene un alto componente de originalidad y creatividad, debido a la estratagema metodoló-gica de que se sirve la autora. A saber, una hermenéutica in obliquo, estrategia consistente en interpretar a la hermenéutica gadameriana a través del prisma de la lógica de la argumentación. (shrink)

In the last decade, the cases of breast and cervical cancer have been positioned at the top rank of cancer statistics worldwide. Consequently, many husbands become family caregivers (FCGs) and get the burden of cancer caregiving. Being blind and incompetent, they need supportive care from healthcare professionals (HCPs). To support them, HCPs provide various healthcare information to meet their needs. Further, their demand for a specific type of healthcare information may reflect their need for emotional support from the HCPs to (...) reduce the burden. This study aims to examine the predictors of the need for emotional support among FCGs of female cancer patients by analyzing the demanded healthcare information. The mindsponge theory was used in conceptual development and interpretation. Bayesian Mindsponge Framework (BMF) analytics were used for statistical analysis on a dataset of 48 husbands and 12 significant others in five congested communities of Surabaya, Indonesia. Results showed that among the six types of healthcare information, the demanded cancer-specific information and information on cancer physical needs significantly predict the need for emotional support among respondents. Meanwhile, FCGs with a higher demand for information on alternative therapies are less likely to need emotional support. Other types of information have ambiguous effects on the need for emotional support. This study reveals that the demanded cancer-specific information, e.g., cancer prognosis or likely outcome, and information on cancer physical needs must be prioritized in information disclosure to meet the needs for emotional support among FCGs of female cancer patients. (shrink)

Last time we introduced the notion of an illocutionary perspective . The basic idea is that the very act of speaking up introduces several discourse referents. The speech act itself (e ) is introduced as the central perspective point ( ε ). In addition, all the speech spheres (p ) where this speech act is realized, as well as the worlds of each sphere (w ∈p ) are introduced as modal topics ( Ω and  ω ).

In this Chapter, Maria Kronfeldner discusses whether psychological essentialism is a necessary part of dehumanization. This involves different elements of essentialism, and a narrow and a broad way of conceptualizing psychological essentialism, the first akin to natural kind thinking, the second based on entitativity. She first presents authors that have connected essentialism with dehumanization. She then introduces the error theory of psychological essentialism regarding the category of the human, and distinguishes different elements of psychological essentialism. On that basis, Kronfeldner connects (...) historical, socio-psychological, and philosophical insights in order to show that although essentialism can act as a catalyst for dehumanization, it is not necessary for it. Examples relate to dehumanization in the context of colonialism and evolutionary thinking, to the history of dehumanizing women from Aristotle to 19th-century craniology, and to contemporary self-dehumanization and ‘lesser mind’ attribution. (shrink)

In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' in which he claimed to present a counterexample to the so-called 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities' ('a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise'). The success of Frankfurt-style cases as counterexamples to the Principle has been much debated since. I present an objection to these cases that, in questioning their conceptual cogency, undercuts many of those debates. Such cases (...) all require a counterfactual mechanism that could cause an agent to perform an action that he cannot avoid performing. I argue that, given our concept of what it is for someone to act, this requirement is inconsistent. Frankfurt-style alleged counterexamples are cases where an agent is morally responsible for an action he performs even though, the claim goes, he could not have avoided performing that action. However, it has recently been argued, e.g. by John Fischer, that a counterexample to the Principle could be a 'Fischer-style case', i.e. a case where the agent can either perform the action or do nothing else. I argue that, although Fischer-style cases do not share the conceptual flaw common to all Frankfurt-style cases, they also fail as counterexamples to the Principle. The paper finishes with a brief discussion of the significance of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. (shrink)

Cancer care has transitioned from clinical-based to home-based care to support longterm care in a more familiar and comfortable environment. This care transition has put family caregivers (FCGs) in a strategic position as care providers. Cancer care at home involves psychological and emotional treatment at some point, making FCGs deal with the stress of cancer patients frequently. Due to their limited care competencies, they need supportive care from healthcare professionals in cancer stress management. This study aims to examine how types (...) of demanded healthcare information affect the FCG’s role in reducing the stress of female cancer patients. The mindsponge theory was used in conceptual development and interpretation. Bayesian Mindsponge Framework (BMF) analytics were used for statistical analysis on a dataset of 48 spouses (husbands) and 12 other family members in five congested communities of Surabaya, Indonesia. Results showed that among the six types of healthcare information, FCGs with higher demand for cancer-specific information were more likely to need support in reducing the stress of female cancer patients. Meanwhile, FCGs with a higher demand for information about support services were less likely to need support to reduce cancer patients’ stress. Other types of healthcare information have ambiguous effects on the need for support in reducing cancer-induced stress. This study reveals that the demanded cancer-specific information, e.g., cancer prognosis or likely outcome, must be prioritized to assist FCG’s role in managing cancer stress. (shrink)

Crosslinguistically, causative constructions conform to the following generalization: If the causal relation is syntactically concealed, then it is semantically direct. Concealed causatives span a wide syntactic spectrum, ranging from resultative complements in English to causative subjects in Miskitu. A unified type-driven theory is proposed which attributes the understood causal relation—and other elements of constructional meaning—to type lifting operations predictably licensed by type mismatch at LF. The proposal has far-reaching theoretical implications not only for the theory of compositionality and causation, but (...) also for the underlying theory of events, space, and time, in natural language discourse. (shrink)

Over the last four decades arguments for and against the claim that creative hypothesis formation is based on Darwinian ‘blind’ variation have been put forward. This paper offers a new and systematic route through this long-lasting debate. It distinguishes between undirected, random, and unjustified variation, to prevent widespread confusions regarding the meaning of undirected variation. These misunderstandings concern Lamarckism, equiprobability, developmental constraints, and creative hypothesis formation. The paper then introduces and develops the standard critique that creative hypothesis formation is guided (...) rather than blind, integrating developments from contemporary research on creativity. On that basis, I discuss three compatibility arguments that have been used to answer the critique. These arguments do not deny guided variation but insist that an important analogy exists nonetheless. These compatibility arguments all fail, even though they do so for different reasons: trivialisation, conceptual confusion, and lack of evidence respectively. Revisiting the debate in this manner not only allows us to see where exactly a ‘Darwinian’ account of creative hypothesis formation goes wrong, but also to see that the debate is not about factual issues, but about the interpretation of these factual issues in Darwinian terms. (shrink)

This paper advances the view that the history of philosophy is both a kind of history and a kind of philosophy. Through a discussion of some examples from epistemology, metaphysics, and the historiography of philosophy, it explores the benefit to philosophy of a deep and broad engagement with its history. It comes to the conclusion that doing history of philosophy is a way to think outside the box of the current philosophical orthodoxies. Somewhat paradoxically, far from imprisoning its students in (...) outdated and crystallized views, the history of philosophy trains the mind to think differently and alternatively about the fundamental problems of philosophy. It keeps us alert to the fact that latest is not always best, and that a genuinely new perspective often means embracing and developing an old insight. The upshot is that the study of the history of philosophy has an innovative and subversive potential, and that philosophy has a great deal to gain from a long, broad, and deep conversation with its history. (shrink)

Ignorance is often a perfectly good excuse. There are interesting debates about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake subvert obligation, but little disagreement about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake exculpate. What about agents who have all the relevant facts in view but fail to meet their obligations because they do not have the right moral beliefs? If their ignorance of their obligations derives from mistaken moral beliefs or from ignorance of the moral significance of the facts they have in (...) view, should they be excused for failing to meet their moral obligations? It is not obvious that they should. In this paper we argue that the best non-skeptical accounts of moral responsibility acknowledge that factual ignorance and mistake will diminish moral responsibility in a way that moral ignorance and mistake will not. That is because factual ignorance is often non-culpable so long as it meets certain merely procedural epistemic standards but the same is not true of moral ignorance. Our argument is that the assumption that it is gets the standards of culpability for moral ignorance wrong, and that the mistake is encouraged by the thought that culpability in general requires an instance of known wrongdoing: that acting wrongly requires de dicto unresponsiveness to one’s obligations at some stage. We deny this and conclude that, therefore, ignorance and mistaken belief are indeed often perfectly good excuses – but far less often than some philosophers claim. (shrink)

The development of explicit theories of dynamic context change has led to a fundamentally new perspective on the interpretation of discourse. In this paper I show that this development also opens up the possibility of approaching subclausal composition along similar lines. More specifically, I argue that a dynamic theory where type-driven rules apply directly to overt surface structures and fill in missing information by building anaphoric bridges is more faithful to natural language semantics than the classical Montagovian approach.

In English, discourse reference to time involves grammatical tenses interpreted as temporal anaphors. Recently, it has been argued that conditionals involve modal discourse anaphora expressed by a parallel grammatical system of anaphoric modals. Based on evidence from Kalaallisut, this paper argues that temporal and modal anaphora can be just as precise in a language that does not have either grammatical category. Instead, temporal anaphora directly targets eventualities of verbs, without mediating tenses, while modal anaphora involves anaphoric moods and/or attitudinal verbs.

In this paper I propose a way of characterizing human agency in terms of the concept of a two‐way power. I outline this conception of agency, defend it against some objections, and briefly indicate how it relates to free agency and to moral praise‐ and blameworthiness.

Reasons can play a variety of roles in a variety of contexts. For instance, reasons can motivate and guide us in our actions (and omissions), in the sense that we often act in the light of reasons. And reasons can be grounds for beliefs, desires and emotions and can be used to evaluate, and sometimes to justify, all these. In addition, reasons are used in explanations: both in explanations of human actions, beliefs, desires, emotions, etc., and in explanations of a (...) wide range of phenomena involving all sorts of animate and inanimate substances. This diversity has encouraged the thought that the term 'reason' is ambiguous or has different senses in different contexts. Moreover, this view often goes hand in hand with the claim that reasons of these different kinds belong to different ontological categories: to facts (or something similar) in the case of normative/justifying reasons, and to mental states in the case of motivating/explanatory reasons. In this paper I shall explore some of the main roles that reasons play and, on that basis, I shall offer a classification of kinds of reasons. As will become clear, my classification of reasons is at odds with much of the literature in several respects: first, because of my views about how we should understand the claim that reasons are classified into different kinds; second, because of the kinds into which I think reasons should be classified; and, finally, because of the consequences I think this view has for the ontology of reasons. (shrink)

Maria Kronfeldner’s Preface and Introduction to the Routledge Handbook of Dehumanization maps the landscape of dehumanization studies. She starts with a brief portrayal of the history of the field. The systematically minded sections that follow guide the reader through the resulting rugged landscape represented in the Handbook’s contributions. Different realizations, levels, forms, and ontological contrasts of dehumanization are distinguished, followed by remarks on the variety of targets of dehumanization. A discussion on valence and emotional aspects is added. Causes, functions, and (...) consequences of dehumanization, and the prospects for reducing or undoing it, are introduced. The systematic overview closes with a discussion of some important theoretical complexities that arise in studying dehumanization. After these systematic sections, the scholarly work on dehumanization gets situated in the broader intellectual landscape of debates about the ‘human’ in the humanities and social sciences. The Introduction ends with some notes on scope, limitations, and intended readership of the Handbook. (shrink)

En su reciente obra Tony Lawson nos invita a recorrer una vez más un análisis detallado de los problemas de la economía como ciencia, y en particular del modelar matemático. Intenta responder a preguntas como ¿qué hacen los economistas académicos modernos?, ¿qué es actualmente la economía mainstream?, ¿qué esla economía neoclásica y qué la heterodoxa?, ¿cómo se relacionan las preocupaciones de los economistas modernos con aquellas que tradicionalmente consideraba la disciplina? y ¿cómo llegó la economía a su estado actual?

Introducir un recorrido a través de la historia y la teoría propia de la filosofía dela economía es una tarea del todo ambiciosa, sin embargo, Mariusz Maziarz lo lleva adelante en esta obra, que se puede considerar un manual actualizado de la filosofía de la economía y, en particular, de la epistemología de la economía. Aun-que no es un libro de historia del pensamiento económico ni de historia de la filosofía de las ciencias, sino más bien una iniciación ordenada a (...) los problemas de la epistemología de la economía, ellos se fundan en la filosofía de la ciencia y están atravesados por cuestiones y debates históricos. Quizás algo de eso sea aquello que Maziarz quiere desenredar en este texto. (shrink)

Largely aided by the neurological discovery of so-called “ mirror neurons,” the attention to motor activity during action observation has exploded over the last two decades. The idea that we internally “ mirror ” the actions of others has led to a new strand of implicit simulation theories of action understanding[1][2]. The basic idea of this sort of simulation theory is that we, via an automatic covert activation of our own action representations, can understand the action and possibly the goal (...) and/or intentions of the observed agent. In this way motor “simulation” is seen as the basis for low-level “mind-reading”; i.e. for the ascription of goals and intentional mental states to others. The thought is that one, through mirroring simulations, can get beyond the observable behaviour to the hidden minds of others. I am questioning the idea of an exclusively “mirroring” role of the motor system in social perception, which is tacitly assumed in this sort of simulation theories. Is motor activity during action observation really primarily a simulation, a detailed “echo” of the others action? My point is not that we never simulate what we observe, but rather to question whether such processes are representative of the overall motor contribution to social cognition. More and more studies on the functional properties of mirror neurons and motor facilitation during perception points to a more complex role of the motor system in action perception. Recently, several proposals have been made attempting to reinterpret and critique the function of motor activity in social situations. I shall here briefly touch on a few of these and sketch parts of my own alternative “social affordance” hypothesis of the sensorimotor contribution to social perception. By way of these analyses I highlight how traditional discussions are marred by problematic theoretical assumptions. It seems to me that we need a thorough reinterpretation not just of mirror neurons and mirroring, but also of what we take motor and social cognition to be. In my view the details of the sensorimotor findings underline the need to move beyond the simplistic idea of the motor system as a unitary output system. In terms of social cognition I question the traditional focus on hidden mental states. I suggest that the motor contribution might have more to do with understanding the process of how others choose their actions, navigate the world and relate to others than with simulating specific actual actions or mental states. I conclude that low-level simulation theories, which see the motor role in social perception as passive “mirroring,” are faced with serious empirical challenges, and that the motor system serve a much more proactive and complex cognitive role in social perception and interaction than previously thought. But my claim is also that many empirical tensions have slipped out of focus due to entrenched theoretical assumptions. Narrow theoretical expectations have marked not only the interpretations but the research itself and I propose that we are in dire need of more studies of actual contextual and interactive social perception. (shrink)

It is generally agreed that for blame to be appropriate the wrongdoer must be blameworthy. However, blameworthiness is not sufficient for appropriate blame. It has been argued that for blame to be appropriate the blamer must have standing to blame. Philosophers writing on the topic have distinguished several considerations that might defeat someone’s standing to blame. This paper examines the underexplored consideration of how personal relationships can influence who has the standing to express blame. We seem to assume that if (...) we do not stand in the right relation to the wrongdoer, it is not our business to blame them. I identify three challenges to this view. First, we do not know what is wrong with meddling (whether it is morally or prudentially wrong). Second, there are cases where we have no close relation to the wrongdoer, but where we seem to have standing nonetheless – murder and other serious moral offences are examples of this. Third, we don’t seem to have a clear conception of what ‘standing’ means, and this makes it hard to see how discussion on standing can help us determine the propriety of blame. This paper defends the notion of standing as a propriety condition on blame in cases of meddling. I argue that personal relationships influence who has the standing to blame through constitution of relationship-specific norms; and that the role these norms play in developing and regulating our relationships can explain why meddlesome blame is morally wrong. (shrink)